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ARBITRATORS SHOULD WRITE OPINIONS FOR PARTIES AND 
FOR COURTS* 
JOSEF ROHLIK** 
The literature of the last decade on arbitration has been dominated by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.1 Strictly 
speaking, Gilmer is one in the long line of Court cases regulating arbitrability 
under law.2  Under Gilmer, arbitration clauses involving claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)3 are specifically enforceable 
under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),4 and, of course, the resulting 
arbitration award may be set aside on the FAA grounds,5 as well as for 
“manifest disregard of the law,” a standard of review developed and accepted 
by most courts.6  In Gilmer, the Supreme Court appears to have retreated from 
a rationale postulated in the context of Title VII7 claims in unionized 
employment, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,8 where the Court said: 
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, 
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution 
of rights created by Title VII. . . .  [T]he specialized competence of arbitrators 
pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land. . . .  Parties 
 
* Professor and Librarian Eileen Searls, in whose honor this collection of essays is published, has 
assembled a premier book collection in our library.  I will always remember that when I joined 
this faculty in 1971, there was a magnificent library, and the most meager library budget.  I 
concluded then, and still maintain today, that Eileen is a magician.  My contribution to this 
collection is made with a hope that one day there will “arbitration reports” on the shelves of the 
law library next to the labor arbitration reports. 
** Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  For the purposes of this essay, it 
should be mentioned that the author once worked for the Regional Office of the American 
Arbitration Association in New York City, and is an arbitrator, and a member of the National 
Academy of Arbitrators.  Thanks to Ms. Deborah Hawkins, a third year law student, for her 
research assistance. 
 1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 2. As opposed to arbitrability under the contractual arbitration clause. 
 3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 4. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4 (1994). 
 5. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). 
 6. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 & n.24 (1953); see also Halligan v. Piper 
Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). 
 8. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
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usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge and judgment 
concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations.  On the other hand, 
the resolution of statutory and constitutional issues is a primary responsibility 
of courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with 
respect to Title VII, whose broad language can be given meaning only by 
reference to public law concepts. 
Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to 
judicial factfinding.  The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as 
complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures 
common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-
examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or 
unavailable.  And as this Court has recognized, ‘arbitrators have no obligation 
to the court to give their reasons for an award.’  Indeed, it is the informality of 
arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and 
expeditious means for dispute resolution.  This same characteristic, however, 
makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII 
issues than the federal courts.9 
Unlike Alexander, which was decided under Section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act,10 Gilmer is a FAA commercial arbitration case.  
However, as none other than David Feller, who sat next to Arthur Goldberg 
when the “Steelworkers Trilogy”11 was argued before the Supreme Court, 
observed, in law “[t]he difference between grievance arbitration and 
commercial arbitration . . . simply disappeared.  The Court embarked on a new 
course designed . . . to avoid litigation.”12 
In terms of arbitration procedure and award, I find three differences 
between grievance and commercial arbitration.  First, grievance proceedings 
prior to the actual arbitration hearing may be viewed as a limited species of 
discovery, while discovery in traditional commercial arbitration, apart from a 
possible subpoena, has not been favored.13  Second, labor arbitration awards 
contain an opinion, whereas in traditional commercial arbitration, outside 
specialized areas,14 such as international trade or admiralty, true opinions are a 
 
 9. See id. at 56-58 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 10. See Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 11. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) 
 12. David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between Statutory 
Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561, 567 (1997). 
 13. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROC. 
(INCLUDING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES) Rule 23 & 34 (1999). 
 14. As in commercial arbitration in general, awards in these cases are not published.  In 
making this statement, I rely on my experience.  In a non-traditional area, such as health care 
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rarity.  In her seminal article on commercial arbitration Soia Mentschikoff 
writes that “[the American Arbitration] Association puts enormous pressure on 
its arbitrators not to write opinions . . . .”15  It has been observed that the reason 
for this pressure is the avoidance of giving the courts an opportunity to attack 
the award,16 i.e., avoidance of the propensity of courts to say what the judges 
want to say, which my colleague, Susan FitzGibbon, called the “judicial itch,” 
borrowing from Judge Richard Arnold’s characterization.17  Finally, traditional 
commercial arbitrators arbitrate infrequently,18 whereas most labor arbitrators 
make a significant living out of that profession, i.e., they have a proven 
acceptability.19 
I find no difference in arbitration proceedings and awards between 1974 
when Alexander was decided, and 1991, when Gilmer was decided.  Gilmer, of 
course, is an employment case, and arguably as so, it would appear to be more 
similar, in its setting to a labor arbitration case than to a “buyer-seller” dispute.  
It does appear, however, that having concluded in Gilmer that the statutory 
rights disputes are arbitrable, the Court is looking for the dominant intention to 
arbitrate.20  In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,21 involving an 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim, while the Court reaffirmed 
Alexander, it did not detract from Gilmer either, with the ambivalent holding 
that the waiver of judicial forum must be “clear and unmistakable.”22 
In lower court decisions following Gilmer, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stands out.  In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai23 the Ninth 
Circuit required a “knowing” agreement to arbitrate Title VII claims,24 which, 
at least for me, can be reduced to the inquiry whether there is a valid contract 
(“arbitration clause”) that evidences the parties’ intent to arbitrate.  Even in 
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.,25 the issue is reduced to the validity of 
 
arbitration, AAA rules require an opinion.  See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS’N, HEALTH CARE 
CLAIM SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (1992). 
 15. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 857 (1961). 
 16. Cf. G. Richard Snell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 523 
n.39 (1989), cited in Feller, supra note 12, at n.77. 
 17. Susan A. FitzGibbon, The Judicial Itch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 485, 491 & n.31 (1990). 
 18. See generally Mentschikoff, supra note 15 (extensively examining the role of traditional 
commercial arbitrators). 
 19. Acceptability is a criterion for the membership in the National Academy of Arbitrators. 
 20. Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 21. 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
 22. Id. at 80. 
 23. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 24. Id. at 1305.  See also Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(affirming the district court’s confirmation of the award, in part, because the plaintiff “clearly 
submitted his claim to binding arbitration.”). 
 25. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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the “compulsory arbitration clauses” as a condition of Title VII as amended.  
Said the court: 
In holding that Form U-4 is unenforceable as applied to Title VII claims, we 
do not, of course, mean to suggest that Congress sought in the 1991 Act to 
preclude employees from agreeing after a claim has arisen to submit the 
dispute to arbitration.  Indeed, employees in many instances may believe that 
arbitration is preferable to protracted and expensive litigation and will 
willingly make that choice.  Because of the legal community’s recently 
increased faith in arbitration, those plaintiffs are now “encouraged” to resolve 
their employment disputes in that manner, and if they choose to do so, they are 
bound by the arbitrator’s decision.  The contract before us, however, requires 
compulsory arbitration in every sense of the word, and it is contracts of that 
nature we are compelled to hold unenforceable under the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.26 
In my judgment, one should be careful of reading Duffield as conditioning 
arbitrability of Title VII claims on a submission to arbitration (of an existing 
dispute) to the exclusion of arbitrability under an arbitration clause (a promise 
to arbitrate future disputes).  Particularly in view of Wright, one should not 
prejudge a case—in the land of the Ninth Circuit—when, for example, a top 
executive freely negotiates an individual employment contract that includes an 
arbitration clause.  I confess that I find that the consent to arbitrate, or the 
dominant intention to arbitrate, in the security industry’s Form U-4 could be 
problematic even under contract law, related to unconscionability, small print 
clauses, and other defenses.27  Of course, it should be noted that the Supreme 
Court has rejected the unequal bargaining power claim in Gilmer.28 
The “practical” policy issue involved in Gilmer and its progeny may 
indeed be the balancing of the value of avoidance of litigation before 
overburdened courts, and the value of the policing and prompting societal 
changes by courts, along the lines of Owen Fiss’s well known statement of 
“bring[ing] a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.”29  As I will 
 
 26. Id. at 1199 (internal citations omitted). 
 27. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp.2d 582 (D. S.C. 1998) (discussing 
contract principles and unconscionability and finding an arbitration clause “unconscionable and 
unenforceable”).  Phillips, however, was a Title VII case, and the decision is heavily dependent 
on the peculiar facts of the case.  Id. at 605-15.  The decision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.  
See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 28. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32. 
 29. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984).  
Utilitarian considerations in enforcement of an arbitration clause have not been limited to the 
avoidance of litigation, even in a situation when the enforcement of the arbitration clause was 
likely to result in a displacement of mandatory rules of U.S. law by an arbitration forum abroad.  
For example, in case involving an alleged violation of Rule 10b-5 of 10(b) of Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, the Supreme Court enforced the arbitration clause.  See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).  The Court additionally distinguished Scherk from Wilko because, 
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attempt to demonstrate, there are some decisions, which only courts can make, 
in exercising their law-making function. 
There is, of course, the third value, that of an accessibility, and a 
claimant’s relatively quick accessibility to a decision making forum.30  
Abstracting from arbitration, the access to courts in civil matters has been 
chiefly regulated by costs which, in employment discrimination matters, 
include the EEOC budget.  I asked myself what would happen if various 
American philanthropists decided to shun education, medical research, and 
other charities, and instead poured all their money into a civil litigation fund 
disbursed on a “first come first served” basis.  Query, whether the intricate and 
interwoven system of administration of justice in the United States, which has 
allowed for orderly, evolutionary progress of American society, would 
collapse. 
The purpose of this essay is not to add anything to the debate of whether 
courts, rather than arbitrators, should decide statutory rights claims.31  Rather, 
 
among other reasons, Scherk involved an “international agreement,” see id. at 515, and further 
noted that: 
The invalidation of such an agreement . . . would . . . reflect a ‘parochial concept that all 
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts . . . . We cannot have trade and 
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed 
by our laws, and resolved in our courts.’ 
Id. at 519 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (involving a 
prorogation clause)). 
 30. See generally Susan FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & 
EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 221, 260-61 n.234 (1997); Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for 
Employee Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 456, 477 (1992). 
 31. Others have done it exhaustively.  See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual 
Harassment Grievances: A Representation Dilemma for Unions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMPLOYMENT L. 1 (1999); Mark L. Adams, Compulsory Arbitration of Discrimination Claims 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Encouraged or Proscribed?, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1619 (1999); 
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: 
Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1 (1998); Stuart L. Bass, 
What the Courts Say about Mandatory Arbitration, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 24 (Nov. 1999); Harvey R. 
Boller & Donald J. Peterson, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 56 (Feb. 1999); 
William H. Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Modifications Necessary for Commercial 
Arbitration Law to Protect Statutory Rights Against Discrimination in Employment: A Discussion 
and Proposals for Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 29 (1998); Harry T. Edwards, 
Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting 
Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 23 (1985); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Harry T. Edwards, Judicial 
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the 
Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L REV. 3 (1988); David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy: The 
Declining State of Labor Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 18 (Sept. 1993); Feller, supra note 12, at 567; 
David M. Kinnecome, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a Method of 
Weakening the Substantive Protections Afforded by Employment Rights Statutes?, 79 B.U. L. 
REV. 745 (1999); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment 
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the purpose of this essay is to suggest that the proliferation of the statutory 
rights may be permeating arbitration cases far beyond individual employment 
cases, and that the arbitrators should write opinions that specifically isolate and 
resolve the statutory issues, or otherwise expressly state that any such specific 
issue is left for the courts or administrative agencies to decide, and leave it to 
the parties to the dispute to whether or not to resort to courts.32 
This proposition raises the old debate of whether arbitrators should follow 
the contract or the law.  To be sure, any arbitrator is the creation of a contract.  
Today, governmental regulatory schemes are so pervasive that an effort to try 
to divorce them from contracts is an exercise in futility.  Besides, it is rare to 
encounter a contract which would so squarely conflict with mandatory rules of 
law that the only possible interpretation of that contract would be that there is 
such an unavoidable conflict.  For instance, a run of the mill “seller-buyer” 
contract must be read against the background of a mandatory rule of law 
imposing the obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement, a 
contract involving exclusive distributorship must be reviewed under anti-trust 
law, and a contract involving securities may involve securities law.  A 
conclusion that a commercial contract mandates a violation of mandatory rules 
of law will be fairly rare, and a decision which would consciously sanction 
such a violation should not be upheld. 
Strictly speaking, the same reasoning should apply to collective bargaining 
agreements.  However, under collective bargaining agreements, the issue has 
been often framed as whether the agreement incorporates the law in question.33  
I am not convinced about the continuing viability of that proposition.  In an 
overwhelming majority of cases the employer and the union are keenly aware 
of mandatory rules governing employment issues and employee rights.  A lack 
of specific reference to such statutes governing the employment area, for 
 
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395 (1999); Leonard D. Polletta, What’s Left After 
Wright? Do Employees Still Have Two Bites of the Apple?, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 48 (Nov. 1999); 
Margo E. K. Reder, Arbitrating Securities Industry Employment Discrimination Claims: 
Restructuring a System to Ensure Fairness, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 19 (1999); 
Daniel Roy, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace After Wright v. 
Universal Maritime Service Corp., 74 IND. L. J. 1347 (1999); David Sherwyn, et al., In Defense of 
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, 
and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 73 (1999); 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999).  For an evenhanded discussion of various issues, 
written before Gilmer, see Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Issues Without Unions, 
66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753 (1990). 
 32. Compare Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of 
Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77, 100-05 (1996) (advocating de novo judicial review). 
 33. See, e.g., David Feller, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims 
Under a Collective Bargaining Agreement: The Odd Case of Caesar Wright, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMPLOYMENT L.J. 53 (1998). 
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example, Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and FMLA, particularly in the presence of 
non-discrimination clauses which today appear in most agreements, can hardly 
be interpreted as limiting the arbitrator’s authority.  I would borrow from a 
different area of decision-making, and suggest that if there appears to be a 
conflict between the collective bargaining agreement and mandatory rules of 
law, the arbitrator should reconsider whether the conflict is “real.”34  If an 
interpretation would avoid a conflict, it should be adopted. 
In non-union employment cases it is easy to conclude that Gilmer’s 
holding that choice of arbitration is a choice of the forum, by which “a party 
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute,”35 extends to all 
mandatory rules of law (i.e., to “statutory rights”).  Apart from top executives, 
the only contract may be the arbitration clause.  In a unionized context, 
arbitrators are deemed to be experts in the “common law of a particular 
industry or of a particular plant[,]”36 for “[t]he collective agreement covers the 
whole employment relationship.”37  In 1960, the Supreme Court distinguished 
labor arbitration from commercial arbitration by stating that “[commercial 
arbitration is, simply] the substitute for litigation.”38  The Court’s statement 
reflects the continuous and all-embracing relationship of the parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement as opposed to an occasional dispute in the 
commercial context.  However, as Mentschikoff points out, there is often a 
commonality between parties to a traditional commercial arbitration, e.g., 
when they are members of a trade association.39  She also writes: “Fact-finding 
norms of an informed nature in commercial matters are more likely to reside in 
arbitrators than in a jury or even in a judge.”40  Accordingly, it is assumed that 
the arbitrator is an expert in the industry or the human endeavor in which he or 
she arbitrates, which, today, must include at least some cursory knowledge of 
some basic legal concepts.41 
While it may be said that expertise in employment statutory rights cases is, 
by definition, limited to the expertise in law, the familiarity with a particular 
employment field should not be underestimated.  More often than not, in 
situations involving an adverse action by the employer, the arbitrator must also 
 
 34. The distinction between “real” and “apparent” conflicts and the reconsideration in the 
field of conflict of laws is the brainchild of Brainard Currie, and gained wide acceptance as a 
refinement of Currie’s original “interest analysis.”  See Brainard Currie, Comments on Babcock v. 
Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242-43 (1963). 
 35. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
 36. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 579. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 578.  See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994). 
 39. Mentschikoff, supra note 15, at 850. 
 40. Id. at 868. 
 41. See generally Feller, supra note 12. 
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evaluate the employer’s stated reason for the action.  In addition, there must be 
some reason why parties to a dispute agreed on a particular arbitrator.  Of 
course, if one party is deprived of a meaningful participation in the arbitrator 
selection process, and/or in the arbitration process in general, the arbitration 
process and the award become highly questionable.42  Most importantly, 
arbitrators may decide only upon the issues submitted to them, whether by 
stipulations, or by claims, counterclaims, defenses, etc., and the parties should, 
or perhaps must, brief them on pertinent law.  The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated in Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., an ADEA case: 
Indeed, we have cautioned that manifest disregard “clearly means more than 
error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.”  We have further noted that 
to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the 
arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or 
ignored it altogether and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well 
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.43 
The arbitrators in Halligan did not explain the award. 
In the 1997 wrongful termination case, Neary v. Prudential Insurance Co. 
of America,44 a Connecticut district court granted Prudential’s motion to 
compel arbitration.  Thereafter, the arbitration panel granted summary 
judgment in favor of Prudential.  The case came back to the district court in 
1999, which held that “based on the arbitration proceedings there [was] no 
doubt that the panel’s decision [had to] be vacated on . . . [the] ground” that the 
“panel’s decision to grant summary judgment was in manifest disregard of the 
law.”45  Similar to the arbitrators’  award in Halligan, there was no explanation 
of the panel’s ruling in Neary.  Said the court with reference to Halligan: “The 
failure of the arbitration panel to explain its decision in this case also buttresses 
this Court’s determination.”46 
There is no question that arbitrators must resolve all issues submitted to 
them or raised before them, and should persuade the parties that they have 
done so.  In Halligan and Neary the courts re-examined the arbitration records.  
I find it obvious that the lack of an arbitration opinion can no longer be viewed 
as insulating the award from the court review. 
Even in a labor arbitration case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
vacated a reasoned award in a labor arbitration case that did not involve any 
mandatory rules of law, because it disagreed with the arbitrator’s interpretation 
 
 42. See Hooters, 39 F. Supp.2d 582 (D. S.C. 1998); Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 
Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).  As a result of the Engalla decision, Kaiser’s arbitrations are now 
administered by the American Arbitration Association. 
 43. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (1998) (internal citations omitted). 
 44. 1997 WL 114789 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 1997). 
 45. 63 F. Supp.2d 208, 209 (D. Conn. 1999). 
 46. Id. at 210. 
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of the contract, and because the arbitrator’s opinion failed to reference 
contractual provisions that the court considered important.47  Judge Wollman, 
dissenting, captured the essence of the decision: 
I respectfully dissent.  I would affirm the order confirming the arbitration 
award.  To hold that the arbitrator ignored the plain language of the contract by 
not specifically referring to the second sentence of Article XV, section 15.2, 
seems to me to be an overly restrictive view of the arbitrator’s role.  This is all 
the more true in light of the fact that section 15.2 does not compel the 
interpretation Hormel places on it.48 
For me, it does not matter whether the case before the reviewing court is a 
commercial case, i.e., an FAA case or a case under a state arbitration statute, or 
a labor case, i.e., a Section 301 LMRA case.  When it comes to statutory rights 
involved in Gilmer and its progeny, it is apparent that the case may end up in 
the courts, even if it is arbitrable.  When it comes to labor cases involving 
statutory rights claims under Alexander, it is clear that such claims are in fact 
arbitrated, and may be arbitrated even though the claimant has access to courts.  
Of course, if the claimant resorts to courts before arbitration, then there would 
be no arbitration.  With respect to the isolation of the statutory rights claims 
and their resolution in the arbitration opinion, there should be no difference.  
After all, the  Alexander Court kept the door open for courts to defer to the 
arbitration award.49 
I again wish to stress, that I do not address the question whether statutory 
claims under Alexander or Gilmer and its progeny, should or should not be 
arbitrated.  I also do not address the question of the text or reach of particular 
arbitration clauses, or of their legal effects as between Gilmer and Alexander.50  
I am simply saying that statutory rights have been arbitrated in commercial and 
labor settings, and I am addressing the opinion of arbitrators in such cases. 
It should be noted that I previously referenced mandatory rules of law as 
being synonymous with statutory rights.  One may object that Alexander and 
Gilmer and its progeny involve, conceptually, discrimination claims.  On the 
one hand, it is evident that rules of law relating to discrimination have had a 
special significance in “remaking” of the American society, even though such 
statutory rules have equal normative value as other mandatory rules of law.  
On the other hand, there are other laws that grant important rights to 
employees, for instance, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
(“FMLA”).51  Although containing blanket references to discrimination,52 
 
 47. George A. Hormel & Co. v. UFCW Local 9, 879 F.2d 347, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1988) 
 48. Id. at 352. 
 49. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. 
 50. See generally Feller, supra note 33. 
 51. The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387; 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). 
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FMLA confers important entitlement on employees, as do many other laws 
protecting employees.  One can even imagine, in this time of increasing 
propensity of many employers to invade more and more of their employees’ 
privacy,53 that there could appear some new statutory employee safeguards in 
this area. 
What follows are three examples of what I consider to be cases involving 
statutory rights in arbitration, in which the arbitrator isolated the statutory issue 
in the opinion.54 
Case Number 1 
The first case arose under a collective bargaining agreement.  A supervisor 
found folding chairs and a table in a building housing electrical equipment.  
The building had a flat roof, and, occasionally, an employee was dispatched to 
sweep the roof.  There was a no entry sign on the building.  As a result of the 
supervisor’s discovery, the employer placed a hidden camera on the roof 
without bargaining with the Union about the placement of the camera.  The 
tape showed several employees smoking what the employer determined was 
marijuana.  The employees were confronted with the tape, confessed to 
smoking marijuana, and were discharged. 
The Union raised the NLRB decision in Colgate-Palmolive Company and 
Local 15, International Chemical Workers Union.55  Colgate-Palmolive 
installed surveillance camera in a restroom and a fitness center.  The Board 
held that the installation of surveillance cameras was a mandatory bargaining 
subject, and that the Colgate-Palmolive failure and refusal to bargain at the 
request of its union violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of NLRA. 
The arbitrator denied the grievance with a specific statement that the roof of 
the building in question was very different from a frequently visited restroom 
and a fitness center.  The arbitrator also pointed out that reinstatement of 
discharged employees is not mandatory, even if a violation of the duty to 
bargain is found.  On the question of the violation of the duty to bargain the 
arbitrator referred the parties to the NLRB. 
 
 52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 (a)(6), (b)(4)-(5).  See Malin, supra note 32, at n.4. 
 53. See, e.g., Barbara Ehrenreich, Warning: This Is a Rights-Free Workplace, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Mar. 5, 2000, at 88. 
 54. The cases were selected because of the disposition of the statutory issue, and the facts 
were patterned on real cases.  Parties did not authorize the disclosure of their identity. 
 55. Case No. 9-CA-32158, 1997 NLRB LEXIS 309 (Apr. 23, 1997). 
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Case Number 2 
A highly skilled engineer, a college graduate, was dismissed from a demanding 
job after coming to work four hours late.  He said that he had “car trouble.”  
He was told that he had arrived late some twenty-five times during the two 
years preceding his dismissal. 
The engineer testified without contradiction that his children had asthma, and 
that he had to bring them to a physician when they had an acute asthmatic 
attack.  He introduced into evidence physician’s certificates covering twelve of 
the prior twenty-five late arrivals to work.  He also testified without 
contradiction that on the other occasions either his son or daughter had an 
attack which did not require a visit to a physician, but which prevented them 
from going to school.  It was stipulated that the engineer once told his 
supervisor about his children’s condition.  The engineer claimed that under the 
statute, the employer had an obligation to investigate whether he was entitled 
to FMLA leave which would have covered his late arrivals to work.  He 
claimed that the employer furnished employees only with general statements 
about FMLA, and did not specifically advise him that he would be entitled to 
an intermittent leave on account of his children’s condition, even though the 
employer knew of that condition. 
It was stipulated that asthma was a qualifying condition under the Department 
of Labor Regulations.56 It was further stipulated that the engineer never 
requested leave, and that the employer heard about his reasons for being late 
for the first time after his dismissal. 
The arbitrator held that the statute and the regulations were not sufficiently 
clear on the issue of the employer’s responsibility to investigate under the 
circumstances of this case, and that there was a paucity of court decisions on 
this subject.  The arbitrator interpreted the statute as requiring the employee at 
the very least to advise the employer of the reasons for his late arrivals when 
they occurred, so that the employer could request appropriate medical 
documentation. 
This case could have occurred either in non-union employment or under a 
collective bargaining agreement.  Under a collective bargaining agreement 
there would have been a further issue of the engineer’s failure to grieve 
progressive discipline. 
Case Number 3 
An African-American employee became disgruntled after a dismissal of a 
close friend.  He was seen carrying a gun.  He had several altercations with co-
employees. After an irrational altercation with a guard over a locked door into 
a building, he was told to stay at home pending investigation.  During the 
 
 56. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(iii)(C) (1999). 
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investigation the employer discovered that the employee made several serious 
threats against the employer and some co-employees, in front of several co-
employees and strangers, all of whom testified.  The threats involved 
references to the Oklahoma federal building bombing, to the employee’s 
prowess with his gun, etc.  The employee was dismissed. 
The employee did not dispute the testimony about the threats he made.  He 
testified that he behaved as he behaved because of the pervasive racism in the 
workplace.  It was admitted that one of the witnesses had routinely called him 
“nigger.”  He testified without contradiction that the previously dismissed 
employee was his only friend at work, and that the guard with whom he had 
the last altercation had always been hostile to him. 
At the time of the arbitration hearing the employee has already filed a 
complaint with the EEOC, but stated on the record that he willingly 
participated in the arbitration. 
The arbitrator concluded that the threats were serious, and given the 
employee’s behavior, that the employer had to take the threats seriously, as the 
employer claimed.  The arbitrator also concluded that the employee worked in 
a hostile environment.  Faced with the conflicting policy issues, the arbitrator 
held that given the contemporary environment of workplace violence, a policy 
decision to grant the relief the employee asked for, which included 
reinstatement to the only job he has ever had, had to be left to the courts. 
Again, this case could have arisen in both, non-union employment or under a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
Several comments should be made about these three cases.  First, as the 
critics of Gilmer fear, each claimant lost.  In addition, while the statutory 
issues were isolated and addressed, the facts controlled each of the three 
decisions.  As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals observed in Cole v. Burns 
International Security Services 57 “[m]ost employment discrimination claims 
are entirely factual in nature . . . .”58 
Second, all three cases could end before public bodies even after the 
arbitration award was rendered.  In the first case, NLRB has original 
jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims but can, of course, defer to the 
arbitration award.  I am not sure whether Alexander would extend to the 
second case, but if the third case arose under a collective bargaining 
agreement, federal courts could ignore the award and conduct a trial, under 
Alexander.  However, the awards in the second and third cases could end up in 
 
 57. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 58. Id. at 1487.  See also Judge Edward’s comments on Cole in Harry T. Edwards, Where 
Are We Heading With Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment? (paper 
presented at an “Alternative Dispute Resolution” conference at Georgia State University’s W.J. 
Usery, Jr. Center for the Workplace (Nov. 2, 1999)). 
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the courts pursuant to a motion to vacate.  Courts would review such awards 
under the manifest disregard of law, or violation of public policy standards.59  
As noted by the Cole court: 
[I]n the vast majority of cases, judicial review of legal determinations to ensure 
compliance with public law should have no adverse impact on the arbitration 
process.[FN]  Nonetheless, there will be some cases in which novel or difficult 
legal issues are presented demanding judicial judgment.  In such cases, the 
courts are empowered to review an arbitrator’s award to ensure that its 
resolution of public law issues is correct.  Indeed, at oral argument, Burns 
conceded the courts’ authority to engage in such review.  Because meaningful 
judicial review of public law issues is available, Cole’s agreement to arbitrate 
is not unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. 60 
[FN] The Hoyman/Stallworth study of arbital awards in discrimination cases 
found that, even in cases where de novo review was available under Alexander, 
only 1.2% of all discrimination cases were reversed by the courts.  See 
[Michele] Hoyman & [Lamont E.] Stallworth, [Grievances in the Aftermath of 
Gardner-Denver,] 39 ARB. J. [49,] at 55 (Sept. 1984). 
Third, the arbitration clauses involved in all three cases pre-dated the 
dispute.  All the cases involved attorneys on both sides, who filed adequate 
post-hearing briefs dealing with the relevant statutory issues.  In the first case, 
a court reporter was present when the arbitrator walked into the room.  In the 
second case, there was no transcript.  In the third case, a court reporter was 
called at the arbitrator’s request.  No issue of discovery was brought to the 
arbitrators’ attention nor were any pre-hearing conferences held in either case.  
In the third case the arbitrator signed several subpoenae prepared by each 
party. 
Fourth, in each case the arbitrator was a lawyer, appointed directly by the 
parties.  The arbitrator’s knowledge of law was not discussed.  In all three 
cases the arbitrator was neither on a roster of employment arbitrators of any 
agency, nor underwent any training in employment arbitration.  In addition, 
none of the parties submitted any agency rules, such as American Arbitration 
Association Rules,61 nor did the arbitrator discuss the Due Process Protocol.62 
Fifth, in the first case, as is customary, each party equally paid the 
arbitrator’s fees.  For the purpose of this essay it is assumed that the arbitrators 
in the second and third cases were paid from an escrow account. 
 
 59. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). 
 60. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487.  See also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32. 
 61. Arbitration: AAA Issues Revised Rules; Officials Discuss Training Program, DAILY 
LABOR REP., May 28, 1997 
 62. A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out 
of the Employment Relationship, DAILY LABOR REP., May 11, 1995. 
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In the first case, NLRB could very possibly hold that Colgate-Palmolive 
applies to placement of hidden cameras anywhere on an employer’s property 
and could further hold that the policy of deterrence requires reinstatement of 
all discharged employees. 
If the second and third cases arose under collective bargaining agreements, 
then under Alexander, as previously noted, a de novo trial could be conducted 
in the third case.  However, even if the two cases reached a court on motions to 
vacate, the courts would essentially be faced with answering clearly stated 
questions.  A court deciding the second case could resort to law-making and 
hold that when an employer is faced with an employee’s unexplained absences 
but has notice that FMLA might cover the employee’s situation, the spirit of 
FMLA mandates that the employer further investigate the situation, to provide 
the employee with an individualized notification of his or her rights under the 
Act.  A court deciding the third case could conclude that as a policy matter, the 
policy underlying Title VII must prevail over any consideration of workplace 
violence.  It appears to me that these two hypothetical conclusions may be 
made only by courts. 
If the second and third cases were arbitrated under collective bargaining 
agreements, the arbitrator would not be covered by the Due Process Protocol or 
by the AAA Rules cited with approval by the Cole court.63  Yet, if these cases 
were arbitrated in a non-union setting, then, arguably, the failure to precisely 
satisfy the Due Process Protocol or AAA Rules could possibly be considered 
an independent reason for the vacation of the award.  That result appears to me 
to be nonsensical, even if explainable by the de novo trial under Alexander, as 
opposed to judicial review of the commercial arbitration award only under the 
FAA and the manifest disregard of the law standard.  As David Feller wrote, 
“[t]he standard for review of an arbitrator’s decision in a non-union situation is 
presently uncertain.  But that standard, whatever it may ultimately turn out to 
be, should apply whether the arbitration is pursuant to a unilaterally imposed 
requirement or by virtue of a collective bargaining agreement.”64  Various 
standards of review or reasons for vacation are normative terms which 
American courts interpret in their pursuit of justice-making.  American courts, 
first of all, decide individual cases.  They may do so by strictly following 
precedents, by lawmaking, or by molding the law or facts to reach the result 
they wish to reach.  A well-reasoned arbitration opinion that isolates the 
statutory issues and explains their resolution should be the only requirement in 
any arbitration case involving statutory rights.  It would certainly allow for 
“focused review” suggested in Cole.65 
 
 63. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1480. 
 64. See Feller, supra note 33, at 81. 
 65. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487. 
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There are no statistics regarding the number of statutory rights cases 
arbitrated in non-union setting66 or the number of labor cases that involve 
statutory rights.67  However, I will assert, based on discussions with fellow 
arbitrators and on my own practice that, for instance, FMLA is finding its way 
into a substantial number of common absenteeism cases under collective 
bargaining agreements. 
I do not believe it possible that the standard of review of any and all 
arbitration awards involving at least statutory rights of employees will not be 
unified.68  After all, as far as the substantive statutory rights are concerned, 
there is no notable difference between unionized and non-unionized 
employees.  Additionally, the application of the scheme tends to spread to 
similar cases when the courts start the process of development of a regulatory 
scheme. 
It would be most unfortunate if courts vacated arbitration awards for 
failure to adhere to private standards such as the AAA Rules, even if 
sanctioned by courts, and irrespective whether they are called procedural 
guarantees or anything else,69 unless the court would find the lack of basic 
fairness prejudicial to either party.  Arbitration would lose its identity, and 
“arbitrators” would become “mini-judges” administering a second tier of 
justice under centralized rules.70  Of course, the obvious retort is that the 
current arbitration is a second tier of justice.  In general, it certainly has not 
been justice imposed on the parties, but rather traditionally has been a dispute 
resolution process desired by the parties.  That should be viewed as a value in a 
democratic society.  Labor arbitration has been “an instrument of industrial 
self-governance”71 which has served this country well.  An ability to destroy it 
 
 66. It even cannot be assumed that post-Gilmer arbitration schemes of employers will be 
utilized in cases of statutory rights only.  I know of two large employers who promulgated 
arbitration schemes in reaction to Gilmer.  However, to date, each employer has had only one 
arbitration, each involving a dismissal for specific substandard performance rather than involving 
any statutory rights. 
 67. Survey of reported cases is beyond the scope of this essay.  However, it is very unlikely 
that most labor awards are reported. 
 68. Judge Edwards, a former arbitrator and law professor, highlights the differences between 
labor and commercial arbitration in his majority opinion in Cole and relies on that difference 
throughout the opinion, citing several well-known authors.  Of course, Cole involved 
enforcement of an arbitration award.  See also FitzGibbon, supra note 29, at 258-60. 
 69. For the proposition that the court should vacate the award if “not satisfied with 
procedural guarantees” see for example, Monica Washington, Compulsory Arbitration of 
Statutory Employment Disputes: Judicial Review Without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 844, 882, 883 (1999). 
 70. Edward Brunet uses the term “Judicialized Arbitration” to describe the current “Contract 
Model of Arbitration.”  See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract 
Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 45 (1999). 
 71. Estreicher, supra note 33, at 757. 
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by making a statutory rights claim in any given arbitration proceedings is 
hardly desirable.  Commercial arbitration is an ancient and traditional method 
of dispute resolution throughout the world.72 
In conclusion, I believe that reasoned arbitration opinions isolating and 
resolving statutory rights issues are desirable for the parties who would know 
why their dispute was decided as it was decided, and also would simplify the 
task of courts in reviewing arbitration awards.  In addition, such awards would 
permit the resolution of the question whether arbitration is a suitable forum for 




 72. Mentschikoff, supra note 15, at 850. 
